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CASE COMMENT

TOWNSHEND V TOWNSHEND & BUTTAR
V BUTTAR: GIFTS, EXCLUSIONS, AND
INTENTIONS
Jonathan Robinson*
This comment looks at two fairly recent decisions by the Ontario
Court of Appeal, Townshend v Townshend (2012 ONCA 868)
and Buttar v Buttar (2013 ONCA 617) with respect to the courts'
handling of the exclusion of gifts under section 4(2) of Ontario's
Family Law Act (RSO 1990, c F.3). In Ontario, gifts made by
third parties outside the marriage to one spouse may be
excluded from the calculation of a spouse's Net Family Property
(NFP). Property may cease to be excludable if it is not kept
separate or if it is used to the benefit of the family. In both
Townshend and Buttar, the court had to grapple with fungible
gifts and decide to what degree the gifts should be excluded from
the NFP calculations. In both decisions, the courts relied upon
a line of reasoning that placed too much weight on the intentions
of the donor when deciding whether (or to what extent) to
exclude the gifts while simultaneously undervaluing the
subsequent behaviour of the donees after delivery of the gift. One
worry these decisions raise is that, if donees of gifts may rely
*

Jonathan Robinson is an articling student at Martha McCarthy &
Company. He graduated with a Ph.D. from the University in Toronto
in 2010 and with a J.D. in 2017 from Osgoode Hall Law School. The
author would like to thank Mary Jane Mossman for her support,
guidance, and criticism.
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merely on the fact of a gift and not on their actions subsequent
to delivery of the gift, litigants will become emboldened to find
far more “gifts” among their property. Even more worrisome,
however, is that the courts may be willing to grant exclusions
regardless of post-delivery behaviour and thereby undermine
the purpose of the NFP calculations: namely, as the preamble of
the Family Law Act says, to allow the court to order an
“equitable settlement of the affairs of the spouses”.
§. 1. INTRODUCTION
Under Ontario’s Family Law Act (FLA; or the Act), one may
exclude gifts received from third parties from the equalization
process.1 Two recent decisions of the Ontario Court of Appeal
illustrate some of the problems this exclusion can pose. Because
gifts are presumptively excluded from a (former) spouse's net
family property, it makes good economic sense to characterize
one's assets as gifts. Excluding gifts from the equalization
process also makes intuitive sense when the gift was made by a
third party to one of the spouses. For though we may marry, our
individuality and autonomy is not thereby irrevocably lost. If
nothing else, a gift, to me, is a sign that we still recognize and
value the individual in the partnership, the “me” in “team”. By
allowing gifts to be excluded from the calculation of family
assets and from being shared at marriage breakdown, the
legislature has signalled that, although individuals may be joined
in a family (ad)venture, their individuality is never fully
“comingled” and lost. Excluding gifts from the equalization
process, then, would seem to be both natural and reasonable.
Still, the law has a remarkable power to complicate even
the simplest of matters. The equalization process under the FLA
is meant to be mechanical and predictable. Compared to other
provinces where property is divided, judges in Ontario are

1

Family Law Act, RSO 1990, c F.3, s 4(2) [FLA].
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supposed to have firmer checks on their discretion.2 Gifts, too,
are meant to be a simple matter. We give gifts all the time
without judicial oversight. Yet, because gifts to one spouse
during a marriage can have important consequences for how
family property will be handled by the courts where spouses
cannot agree how to divide their assets, gifts easily become hotly
contested. We should not lose sight of the role the courts play in
this process, for it is not merely a question of determining
whether a gift was made. When a court declares a valuable asset
is or is not a gift, the effect of that decision implicitly, if not
explicitly is to foreground the relative importance of
individual autonomy or familial interdependence. The analyses
of Buttar v. Buttar and Townshend v. Townshend3 are both
problematic in the way they assess gifts and whether they should
be excluded, and the balance between individual and family is
upset as a result.
The problem in both cases is how the courts treat the
intentions of the donors. A donor's intentions do matter. One
must intend a gift to make a gift. The donor's intentions do three
important things: they indicate that a gift was made, what the
gift is, and to whom the gift was made. What the donor's
intentions do not do is indicate how the gift may be used. A gift
is not a contract4 and one may not, generally, impose conditions
on the use of the gift once ownership has passed. The recipient,
2

See Schreyer v Schreyer, 2011 SCC 35, [2011] 2 SCR 605 at para 15;
Mary Jane Mossman et al, Families and the Law: Cases and
Commentary, 2nd ed (Concord, Ont: Captus Press, 2015) at 471 2.

3

Buttar v Buttar, 2013 ONCA 617, 116 OR (3d) 481 [Buttar];
Townshend v Townshend, 2012 ONCA 868, 113 OR (3d) 321
[Townshend]. These cases concern not only gifts, but gifts at the time
of marriage breakdown.

4

Richard Hyland, Gifts: A Study of Comparative Law (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2009) §§ 1315 6, 1324 (noting that common law
regimes reject the civil law view of gifts as contracts).
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or donee, may accede to the donor's wishes as a matter of logic
or morality, but, from a legal perspective, the coincidence of the
donor's intentions and the recipient's post-delivery actions are
just that a coincidence. Thus, it is important to recognize when
the donor's intentions no longer matter for the purposes of the
Act. Once the gift has been made, it is the intentions and actions
of the recipient that matter. If a gift is to be excluded from the
(original) recipient's assets in the family law context, it should
not be because of what the donor intended. A court should pay
little to no heed to the donor's intentions. Arguably, presuming
the intentions of the donor were to benefit the individual and not
the couple, if we treat a donor's intentions as having any legal
meaning beyond determining that a gift was made, it will usually
come at the cost of a corresponding de-emphasis on the
recipient's intentions and actions post-delivery. The result is a
privileging of the individual over the couple, which may be what
a party wants while litigating their separation, but not
necessarily what their intentions were during the marriage.
Surely the time that matters most for determining how gifts
should be treated pursuant to the Act comes not before the gift
was made, and not after a marriage breaks down, but the time in
between.
The Act describes the treatment of gifts in a deceptively
straightforward manner. Under the FLA, subsection 4(2), it is
clear that gifts following the date of marriage may be excluded
from the calculation of a spouse’s net family property
this may even include any income generated from the gift.5 At
5

Net family property is defined at FLA, supra note 1, s 4(1):
“net family property” means the value of all the property, except
property described in subsection (2), that a spouse owns on the
valuation date, after deducting,
(a) the spouse’s de ts and other lia ilities, and
(b) the value of property, other than a matrimonial home, that the
spouse owned on the date of the marriage, after deducting the
spouse’s de ts and other lia ilities, other than de ts or lia ilities
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common law, it is generally thought that there are only three
basic requirements for an inter vivos gift: (i) the donor must
intend to make a gift, (ii) the would-be recipient of the gift the
donee must accept the gift, and (iii) control over the gift must
be surrendered, which is sometimes referred to as (sufficient)
delivery.6

related directly to the acquisition or significant improvement of a
matrimonial home, calculated as of the date of the marriage “ iens
familiaux nets”
FLA, supra note 1, s 4(2) reads, in part:
The value of the following property that a spouse owns on the valuation
date does not form part of the spouse’s net family property
1. Property, other than a matrimonial home, that was acquired by gift
or inheritance from a third person after the date of the marriage.
2. Income from property referred to in paragraph 1, if the donor or
testator has expressly stated that it is to be excluded from the
spouse’s net family property.
[...]
5. Property, other than a matrimonial home, into which property
referred to in paragraphs 1 to 4 can be traced.
6

See e.g. McNamee v McNamee, 2011 ONCA 533, 106 OR (3d) 401 at
para 24 [McNamee]. See also Bruce Ziff, Principles of Property Law,
5th ed (Toronto: Carswell, 2010) at 156-66. Cf Mary Jane Mossman &
Philip Girard, Property Law: Cases and Commentary, 3rd ed (Toronto:
Emond Montgomery, 2014) at 430 1.
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Table 1: Examples of Equalization Payment with a Gift Deduction.

In Ontario, the determination that some asset was a gift
to only one of the spouses can radically revise the equalization
payment one spouse owes to the other. Rather than divide a
family’s property and assets directly, the ct attempts to achieve
a just and fair result by calculating a dollar value of each
spouse’s
and directing the spouse ith the larger alance to
pay one-half of the difference to the other spouse.7 In the
simplest scenario, if one can deduct a sizeable gift from their
NFP, then one will become entitled to either a decrease or
increase of 50% of the value of the gift in the equalization
payment they will give or receive. In some cases, it is possible
that exclusions of gifts will mean that the other spouse must
provide the equalization payment rather than receive one (see
Table 1 for a simplistic illustration8). In other words, excluding
gifts can significantly affect what constitutes the just and fair
division of property that is meant to flo from the “equal
contri ution” of the spouses during the marriage.9

7

FLA, supra note 1, s 5(1).

8

Note that the tables are written only to highlight the net “real orld”
effect a gift has on the NFP: strictly speaking, excluded gifts are never
truly a part of one’s
.

9

See FLA, supra note 1, s 5(7) (stressing how marriages are comprised
of “equal contri ution s ” hich is the reason
s deserve
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Both Townshend and Buttar illustrate some of the
problems gifts pose for the Ontarian regime of equalization. In
what follows, I shall outline the relevant circumstances of each
decision (§. 2) and the reasons for the decisions (§. 3 and §. 4),
before turning to an analysis of the deeper issues (§. 5). The last
sections explore the impact (§. 6) and, by way of conclusion, the
broader policy implications of these two decisions (§. 7).
§. 2. FACTS & ISSUES BEFORE THE COURT
In Townshend, the husband appealed an equalization payment
order. The appeal came after a long marriage of 33 years ended
in separation in 2005.10 At trial, the judge had ordered the wife
to pay the husband an equalization payment of $31,368.08,11
which is $3,631.92 less than the $35,000 partial indemnity cost
award made in favour of the wife.12 One must surely wonder
whether the costs of the trial, weighed against the equalization
payment, influenced the hus and’s decision to appeal.
For Mr. Townshend, the issues on appeal related to the
calculation of his NFP. These included:
1.
2.
3.
4.

A claim for an $8,500 credit with respect to
a one-acre parcel of land;
An inter vivos gift valued at $25,000;
A 1967 Buick, which (he claimed) was a
gift;
A GMAC car loan;

equalization).
10

Townshend, supra note 3 at para 1.

11

Townshend v Townshend, 2010 ONSC 6405, [2010] OJ No 5369 (QL)
at para 63 [Townshend ONSC]. In the Court of Appeal the amount is
said to have been one cent less; see Townshend, supra note 3 at para 2.

12

Ibid at paras 2, 55.
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5.
6.

he ife’s claim for a deduction of a
$12,000 debt owed to her parents; and
A claim regarding the hall stand (later
abandoned during oral argument).

In the subsequent sections, the focus shall be on the $25,000 gift.
Approximately half a year after Townshend, the Ontario
Court of Appeal released its decision for Buttar, which partly
considered similar issues. Separation again came after a long
marriage of 36 years.13 The facts are a little more involved in this
case. The parties married in 1972 and built a home together on a
property o ned y the hus and’s family the follo ing year. n
1978, his parents gave the couple the property on which the
house was built.14 The following year, Mr. Buttar's parents
“transferred o nership and control” of the farming usiness to
the couple; this included another property, referred to as the
“ ome ain farm”. hey also sold their son livestoc for
,
, and “gifted to him alone” a 5,970 kg milk quota. Of
particular significance was that the parents were careful and
intentional in these transactions. The milk quota was structured
as a gift in order to gain certain tax benefits.15 The motivation
was to avoid paying various taxes that would otherwise be
required if the milk quota were not given as a gift. Over time,
the Buttars acquired further properties, bringing the total to six,
along with a time-share interest in a Collingwood property, and
an increasingly large milk quota (27,561 kg).16 In addition to the
individual assets each person held, the milk quota sufficed to pay
off the remaining debt the family had owed to Farm Credit
Canada with a surplus of $358,253.46. Other farm equipment
13

Buttar, supra note 3 at para 1.

14

Ibid at para .
the property.

15

Ibid at para 5.

16

Ibid at paras 6 10.

ote that the court

rote that “the parties”

ere given
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was bought and sold following the date of separation.17
In the final years of the marriage, Ms. Buttar worked
only sporadically at a local service club, earning less than $3,000
per year. Two bouts with cancer (1989 and 2006) made work
involving heavy manual labour difficult.18 Following the
separation, the farm business seemed to prosper. Mr. Buttar's tax
return for 2010 approached $900,000. However, he anticipated
a drastic reduction in his income after the dairy operation ended
in 2010, and suggested it might be less than $20,000 per year.
He ceased his $2000 monthly payment of spousal support at that
time.19
The court of appeal addressed a number of issues in light
of this complicated sequence of events (many, it may be noted,
taking place after the date of separation). These were:
1.

2.
3.
4.

Whether the appellant, Mr. Buttar, could
deduct the present value of the disposition
costs, including the capital gains tax, that he
would incur when he sells the properties;
Whether the 1979 milk quota may be
excluded from his NFP;
How much spousal support is owed to the
respondent; and
Whether and how the jointly-owned
properties should be distributed.20

Our focus in what follows is the second issue.

17

Ibid at paras 10 11.

18

Ibid at para 12.

19

Ibid at para 13.

20

Ibid at para 14.

274

Canadian Journal of Family Law [Vol. 30(2), 2017]

§. 3. REASONS IN TOWNSHEND
Mr. Townshend claimed an exclusion for a $25,000 gift, which
was deposited (by the wife, he alleged) into a joint bank account.
In the court below, Justice Kruzick, had accepted that the gift
had been made to the husband alone.21 But, crucially for him, the
deposit into the joint account robbed the gift of its exclusive
nature.22 It became, in effect, a gift to the family. Ultimately,
there was no exclusion, and both spouses were to enjoy the
benefit of the gift equally. That is, the $25,000 benefited each
spouse by the same absolute amount (compare columns 1 and 3
in Table 2, below, for a fictional illustration). If one is of the
view that a deposit into a joint account signals an intention to
enefit the family equally, then ustice ruzic ’s decision
makes sense.
Justice Simmons did not agree. Like Kruzick J., Justice
Simmons did not accept that the money was deposited in a joint
account contrary to Mr. o nshend’s ishes or that he as
unaware of the deposit.23 Nonetheless, she concluded that the
hus and should have received an exclusion for “one-half of the
amount of the gift”.24 Although apparently uneasy with it,
Justice Simmons relied on the popular interpretation of Colletta
v. Colletta:25 hen something is “deposited into a joint account
it loses its exclusionary character to the extent of the one-half
interest that is presumed to e gifted to the spouse”.26 Her
reading of the Act is that a court must determine ownership prior
21

Townshend ONSC, supra note 11 at para 44.

22

Ibid.

23

Townshend, supra note 3 at para 19.

24

Ibid at para 20.

25

Colletta v Colletta, [1993] OJ No 2537, 50 RFL (3d) 1 (CA). For her
hesitations, see Townshend, supra note 3 at paras 27 28.

26

Ibid at para 28.
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to calculating the spouses’
.27 Section 4(2) of the FLA
stresses that certain property that one in fact “o ns . . . does not
form part of the spouse’s net family property”.28 As already
mentioned, gifts from after the marriage can be excluded, as can
gifts hich can e “traced” into other property.29

Table 2: Consequences of Decisions of Kruzick J and Simmons JA.

Although it is not stated outright, it seems that Justice
Simmons relied on the tracing exclusion.30 The $25,000
ultimately resided in an account that held $31,000 on the date of
separation about nine months after the deposit.31 In this case,
and due to the fungible nature of money, it is easy to find, if one
ishes, that the entire
,
is “still” in the joint account. And
Justice Simmons was willing to make that determination. More
27

See McNamee, supra note 6 at paras 56 63, cited by Simmons J in
Townshend, supra note 3 at para 28.

28

FLA, supra note 1, s 4(2); Cf McNamee, supra note 6 at para 65.

29

FLA, supra note 1, s 4(2) #5; the text is partially reproduced supra note
5.

30

Cf Townshend, supra note 3 at para 35. On tracing, see Ilana I
yl erman
Brian Bur e, “ racing Exclusions in amily a ”
(2006) 25:1 Can Fam LQ 67.

31

Ibid at para 34.
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questionably, she rejected the suggestion that it would be better
to analyze the actual credits and debits of the joint account to
determine hether the “gift could e traced into the funds that
remained in that account” on the date of separation.32
While it is likely true that producing and analysing such
bank accounts would complicate and prolong cases such as
these, drawing the ratio that one need not do so when dealing in
specie is not without problems. It was easy in this case because
the disputed amount as “still” availa le. fter all,
,
is
less than $31,000. But what if the amounts had been reversed?
As noted above, Justice Simmons decided that one-half of the
gift may be excluded even if deposited into a joint account. What
would happen if the gift had been $31,000 but only $25,000 were
left (for example, imagine $6000 had been invested in
improvements to the matrimonial home)? Half of the gift
$15,500 would still be in the joint account. Should that be
excluded and the remaining $9,500 be divided into each
spouse’s
ould there ever e a situation here the entire
remaining $25,000 would be considered a gift that one might
exclude? Would that even make sense if some of the gift had
been spent to benefit the family? It is not clear what the right
answer is.33 ustice immons’ decision is unhelpful and provides
no guidance if part of the gift is no longer clearly available in the
way it is in Townshend. Indeed, it would only get more
complicated if the interest on the value of the (excluded portion)
of the gift were excluded as well pursuant to the FLA, subsection
4(2), paragraph 2.

32

Ibid at para

33

But see Ho v Ho, 1 RFL (4th) 340, 1993 CarswellOnt 287 (WL) at
paras 24
ife a le to “trace”
,
of a
,
gift from her
father-in-law; entitled only to deduct that amount as the rest had been
“comingled ith the other funds to such an extent that it is not possible
to trace the items claimed y the ife” . or other decisions on related
matters, see Zylberman & Burke, supra note 30 at 92 99.

, such an approach is re ected as “overly formalistic”.
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Of course, as the calculated NFP is merely a notional
value, one solution might be to say that the donee is entitled to
deduct one-half the value of the gift regardless of how the other
property and finances of the former spouses line up. That is, the
criticism above is only about the complexities of realizing the
equalization payment; but it is not any more complicated to use
the above ratio to determine the amount that may be excluded
pursuant to a gift that was deposited into a joint account. Half of
$31,000, in the end, is no more difficult to compute than half of
$25,000. Yet, another problem remains. In fact, the consequence
of allowing the original donee to deduct one-half the value of the
gift from his or her
results in the donee ending up in “real
orld” terms
ith three-quarters of the benefit of the gift
notwithstanding the arguably clear act of conjoining or
comingling the gift with the other shared assets of the (former)
family. The middle column of Table 2, above, helps illustrate the
point. What it shows is that the beneficiary of the gift, despite
his or her deposit into a joint account, ends up with 75% of the
value of the gift.
§. 4. REASONS IN BUTTAR
In Buttar, the issues relate to the calculation of the spouses’
and spousal support (my focus shall be on the respective NFP
calculations). Justice Rosenberg ruled that the milk quota should
not be excluded from Mr. Buttar's NFP, despite the fact that it
was initially described as a gift to one party.34 Justice Rosenberg
noted that the gift, or “transfer”, seemed to serve a purpose
beyond what a simple gift might have, for, as he noted, the gift
helped Mr. Buttar's father avoid various tax consequences.35 The
gift lacked the altruism normally associated with gifts. It is hard
34

Buttar, supra note at para the quota “gifted to the appellant alone”
the quota as structured “as a gift to his son” .

35

Ibid at para 5; at para 26, Rosenberg J notes the application judge made
the same determination.
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to escape the conclusion that Justice Rosenberg is importing a
concern with motivation into his analysis of intention.36
Justice Hatton, the application judge, found that because
there was consideration for the transfer of the milk quota, which
came in the form of a life interest in the family farm, it was not
a gift.37 In addition, the judge was concerned that the milk quota
had been subject to a series of transactions over the years.
Notably, it had grown in size and value. The milk quota which
had been sold in 2010, therefore, was due to the efforts of both
spouses.38 Regarding the legal analysis of the requirements for a
gift, Justice Rosenberg began his own analysis by stressing that
gifts must be freely given. Altruism must be the central
element.39 However, after exploring the legal requirements for a
gift, which here turned on a question of whether there was
consideration for the milk quota, he declined to overturn the
application udge’s determination that consideration had een
given. For Justice Rosenberg, this was a finding of fact that
should only e overturned in a case of “palpa le and overriding
error”,40 and, in his view, there was none on this point.41
36

See McNamee, supra note 6 at para 34 (holding that it is an error of
law to conflate intention, which is a prerequisite for a gift, with the
“underlying motivation or purpose” for the gift Cf Hyland, supra note
4 at § 288. The appellant in Buttar was alive to this issue: see Buttar,
supra note 3 at para 30.

37

Buttar, supra note 3 at para 26. I was unable to obtain a copy of Justice
atton’s decision.

38

Ibid.

39

Ibid at para 29, citing Peter v Beblow, [1993] 1 SCR 980, 101 DLR
(4th) 621 at 991 92.

40

Buttar, supra note 3 at para 33, citing Housen v Nikolaisen, 2002 SCC
33, [2002] 2 SCR 235 at para 10.

41

This was not true of other aspects of the original decision. See e.g.
Buttar, supra note 3 at paras 54, 57, 63, 65, 67, 71.
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§. 5. ANALYSIS
Jurists have long been suspicious of gifts,42 but they are a
common part of everyday life. When legal difficulties over giftgiving occur, it often relates to the requirement that the donor
must surrender control or “deliver” the gift. n Townshend and
Buttar, however, the problem for the courts seemed to be how
much eight one should attach to the “true” su ective
intentions of the donor and/or donee.
This concern with intentions is surprising for a number
of reasons. The most important is that, from a doctrinal
perspective, the intentions of both parties are only important for
determining that a gift was given (here the focus is on what
might be called a simple gift: no trusts are being considered).
Clearly, once the gift has been made, the intentions of the donor
regarding the gifted item no longer have any legal force. This is
hat the requirement that the gift e “delivered” is meant to
show: that one has surrendered any legal claim over the gift.43
While it is true that the donee may feel some residual obligation
to follow the wishes of the donor, and there may indeed even be
good reasons to follow those wishes, there is no longer any
legally enforceable obligation. The obligation may be moral or
rational, but it is not legal.
The intentions of the donee are likewise specific and
42

Nicholas Laurent-Bonne, Aux origines de la liberté de disposer entre
époux (Issy-les- oulines extenso ditions,
at “ e discours
des juristes révèle une m fiance instinctive l’ gard des li eralit s, de
quelque nature qu’elles soient, ainsi qu’en t moignent les solennit s
particulières entourant, dans la plupart des législations occidentales, les
donations, et ce depuis le droit romain tardif” .

43

Delivery is also sometimes said to be necessary because there can be
no consideration given in return for a gift (where consideration is
meant to indicate that the offeree accepted the offeror’s terms . Cf Re
Cole, [1964] 1 Ch 175 (CA), cited in Mossman and Girard, supra note
6 at 432, and Ziff, supra note 6 at 157.
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solely focused on the act of receiving the gift. It is doubtlessly
true that the donee may have other ideas about what she will do
ith the gift invest it, urn it, “re-gift” it, etc. , ut that is not
the intention a court would assess directly for the purposes of
determining whether there was an inter vivos gift. At best, such
intentions about how the item will be disposed of in the future
would be an indication that the person intended to receive the
item as the donee of the gift. In this sense, the wording of the
FLA, subsection 4(2), paragraph 2, may seem surprising:
Income from property referred to in paragraph 1
[i.e., a gift or inheritance] [may be excluded], if
the donor or testator has expressly stated that it is
to e excluded from the spouse’s net family
property.
In this case, the law is clear that the intentions of the
donor regarding the disposition of the gift (or inheritance) should
survive the transfer of the gift. Although this may appear to be
an example of “dead hand control”, it is a ustifia le provision.
One important purpose this provision serves is that it allows a
cash or fungible gift to operate in the same way the gift of a
valuable item might. A valuable painting tends to appreciate
over time, and when it is a gift being excluded under the FLA,
subsection 4(2), it is the painting that is excluded, not the value
of the painting on the day it was given. Thus, subsection 4(2),
paragraph 2, allows fungible gifts the possibility of operating in
the same way. One could imagine it as the gift-giver trying to
give a gift that appreciates like a valuable painting might. In
other words, the point is that the donor is given the authority to
give the gift she intends to. he donor’s intentions, as discussed
above, help us determine what the gift is, or, to put the matter
differently, determine the scope of the gift. In that sense, it is not
an example of “dead hand control” at all, ut a ay to counteract
the (reasonable) default position that any consequent income
from the gift will not be excluded unless it be explicitly so
designated.
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The problem with the Townshend decision, however, is
that affords un ustifia le “dead hand control” to the donor at the
expense of the post-delivery intentions of the donee. In fact, it
should be the reverse. If the donee subsequently acts in a way
that suggests that the gift is being used to benefit the family, it
should no longer matter what the intentions of the gift-giver
were. The donor (normally) is not in charge of the well-being of
the family, and no longer has any “say” over ho the gift can
and cannot be used.44 Once the gift is received, the only intention
that should matter is that of the donee, who has become the
owner. In the case of Mr. Townshend, the questions that should
have been asked were: (i) what was his intention regarding this
gift? and (ii) what did he do with this gift?45 One might note, in
passing, that the answers to these questions must include
consideration of the donee’s intentions and actions prior to the
breakdown of the marriage. It is usually all too easy to guess
what they might be once litigation has begun.
The answers to these questions suggest that Justice
ruzic ’s decision as the right one. t was not entirely clear
who deposited the $25,000 into the joint account.
44

Cf Mackedie Estate v Mackedie, [1998] BCJ No 2200 (SC), cited in
Mossman & Girard, supra note 6 at 438 (son, the donee, found to have
received gifts where, post-delivery, the pictures were hung back on
donor’s all and thus still in the donor’s “possession” attempt y
donor to leave paintings to someone else by will failed).

45

For an example of a transfer to the other spouse, see e.g. Cartier v
Cartier, 47 RFL (6th) 436, 2007 CanLII 52427 (Ont Sup Ct J) at para
“ hen a spouse transfers gifted or inherited property into oint
names, thereby conferring an interest in the other spouse, the
transferring spouse loses the exclusion only to the extent of the gift he
or she made to the other spouse, provided that the result intended by
the transfer is oint o nership.” emphasis in original . Of course,
determining the intention of a donee-turned-donor spouse may not be
straightforward.
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Mr. Townshend suggested it was his spouse. Even if this were
true, he not only let that action stand, but it appears that the
money may have een su sequently transferred into a “ oint
investment account”.46 With respect, when Justice Simmons
writes that she can find no “legislative intent” regarding hether
“the entire amount of the gift should lose its excluded character
hen deposited into a oint an account”,47 she has already
started down the wrong track. It is true that the wording of the
FLA seems to suggest that gifts can never stop being a gift. But
the idea is preposterous. It only begins to make sense when the
gift is of significant value and, possibly, when the gift was not
made too long ago. The reason for this may well be because
although separating spouses would not care much about a $100
gift made five years ago, they likely will care a great deal about
a $100,000 gift made 25 years ago. Regardless, depositing
money into a “ oint investment” account should generally signal
an intention to use that money to benefit the family.
In the case of Buttar v. Buttar, it is difficult to
disentangle all the strands related to the milk quota. There are
two issues that must be considered: (i) the fact that the milk
quota did not stay the same size (i.e., 5,970 kg) from the time of
the gift, and (ii) the relationship of the milk quota to the larger
transfer.
Regarding the first issue, one might think the best way
to approach the quota is to treat it as a good that can be traded in
specie, much like money (and unlike, say, a painting). If so, then
there would be no difficulty in reasoning along the lines adopted
in Townshend. After all, 5,970 kg is less than 27,561 kg. The
quota of 5,970 kg was worth $403,858.02 at the date of
46

Townshend ONSC, supra note 11 at para 44; Cf Townshend, supra note
3 at para
descri ing the “ oint investment account” as simply a
“ cotia c eod oint account” .

47

Townshend, supra note 3 at para 32.
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separation.48 Since Mr. Buttar was ultimately ordered to pay an
equalization payment of $112,986.69 and a $160,000.00 lump
sum for spousal support, subtracting the value of the milk quota
from his NFP would have radically revised the outcome Justice
Hatton reached.49 In fact, there is nothing particularly
complicated in separating out, notionally, the portion of the milk
quota that was a gift (if it were a gift). What more meaningfully
differentiates the quota from the cash gift in Townshend is the
idea that the quota was used by the family and, as a consequence
of the family’s activities, the family’s prospects gre . t may not
e possi le to say that ho they “used” the mil quota as the
direct or sole cause of the quota’s growth to nearly five times its
initial value. What matters is that there is no clear indication that
Mr. Buttar “hived off” the mil quota from the rest of the
family as if it were a private project for his own benefit all
those years.
Thus, with respect to the second issue, even if the
application judge had not determined that Mr. Buttar's family
had received consideration in the form of a life interest in the
farm,50 the actions after the gift has been received should also
matter. Intentions matter for gifts: essentially, both giver and
receiver must have the intention to be involved in the transfer of
a gift. Once it has een received, ho ever, only the receiver’s
(subsequent) intentions matter. If the receiver should use the gift
in a clearly private manner, then a case could be made that it
should be excludable under the FLA, subsection 4(2). But what
should the presumption be when the gift is not clearly used in an
“exclusive” manner urely the correct ans er is that the gift
48

The ratios align in the following way:

5,960

403,858.02

27,561

1,867,572.30

.

49

I have been unable to find the original decision of Justice Hatton, and
the appendix of Buttar, supra note 3, only includes “ chedule B”,
hich sho s ho the property as divided. resuma ly a “ chedule
” laid out the
calculations.

50

Ibid at 26, 33.
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oins or ecomes “comingled ith” the family property. That is,
the gift should lose its claim to an independent existence in
proportion to the degree the donee chooses to treat it that way.
Clearly, such a presumption would tend to affect fungible gifts
in specie more than it would discrete items of value such as
artwork. But is there not a difference between gifting, say, El
reco’s Adoracíon de los Reyes Magos to an aficionado of
Renaissance art and giving the same individual money which she
deposits in her joint investment account?51 Moreover, if the
painting were sold and the proceeds then deposited in the joint
investment account, would there be any doubt as to whether that
sum should e “traced” pursuant to the FLA, subsection 4(2),
paragraph 5? A recognition of this sort would, moreover, accord
with the presumption of the “ oint responsi ilities” and “equal
contri ution” that underlies the purpose of equalization in
subsection 5(7).52
In Buttar, it seems as though the right result was reached
on the milk quota, but for the wrong reasons. The milk quota was
excluded on the basis that it was not a gift. The parents received
a life interest in the farm, it is true, but it is not directly or solely
51

Cf Cortina v Cortina, 2014 ONSC 5321 at paras 342 66 (husband
receives inter vivos gift, deposits it in joint account, but then moves it
to a private investment account; judge willing to trace the money
“through the oint account” here it as temporarily “par ed” ithout
a finding of comingling . ustice afreni re’s decision on the merits
was upheld on appeal: Cortina v Cortina, 2015 ONCA 750 at paras
10 20. Unfortunately, the analysis in both decisions also relies, in part,
on determining the donor’s intentions.

52

FLA, supra note , s
“ he purpose of this section is to recognize
that child care, household management and financial provision are the
joint responsibilities of the spouses and that inherent in the marital
relationship there is equal contribution, whether financial or otherwise,
by the spouses to the assumption of these responsibilities, entitling
each spouse to the equalization of the net family properties, subject
only to the equita le considerations set out in su section .”
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in consideration of the milk quota that they acquired this interest.
In order to connect the life interest to the milk quota, the gift had
to be included in a larger transaction. In other words, the court
went behind the (professed) subjective intention of the donors
and decided that the gift could not be a gift because it was
“structured” so only for the tax enefits.
Arguably, this is inconsistent with McNamee, where the
same court stated in fairly clear terms that the motivation for a
gift does not matter “ transfer of property y ay of gift may
equally be motivated by commercial purposes provided the
transfer is gratuitous.”53 The situation in Buttar is more
complicated, to be sure, but it is by no means clear that the gift
must be included among the larger transaction in such a way as
to deny the professed understanding of the parties. Surely, had
the court felt it more just in the circumstances, it would have had
no trouble at all disaggregating the gift from the rest of the
transaction and concluding that the consideration was not in
exchange for the milk quota. In some respects, one might be
inclined to suggest this conflation of motivation and intention is
also inconsistent with Ho v. Ho, where Justice Ferrier ruled that
the husband could not “have it oth ays” if it as counted as
a gift for tax purposes, then it should be considered as a gift in
other contexts as well.54
§. 6. IMPACT OF TOWNSHEND AND BUTTAR
There should be little doubt that both of these decisions work
against a presumption that the assets of a family should, by
default, be shared. A more positive spin would be that the rules
regarding the excludability of gifts is a recognition that spouses
are still entitled to be individuals and have things of their own.
53

McNamee, supra note 6 at para 37 (overturning the trial judge on this
point); see also ibid at para 34.

54

Ho v Ho, supra note 33 at para 19.
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When it comes to calculating our NFP, after all, we should not
need to account for every trinket we were given.
Townshend is concerning for a few reasons. Above all,
it will encourage divorcing spouses (or their lawyers) to seek to
claim as many gifts as possible. The fact that one might still
exclude half the value of the gift even after depositing it in a joint
bank account (and then split the remaining half) will prove to be
a strong incentive. Two further consequences follow from this.
First, if the partners come from different enough economic
ac grounds, the “ ealthier” spouse may ell insulate many
assets from equalization. Second, if one spouse has regular or
more frequent access to lawyers and legal advice, the gift
exclusion has the potential to benefit the person who is aware of
it. Indeed, if one can still benefit from three-quarters of the value
of a gift after depositing it in a joint investment account, then
there is a strong incentive to track down all the gifts one can.
The significance of Buttar may seem to temper the
result of Townshend, but the analysis is also problematic. In
terms of the impact the decision may have in the future, it is hard
to say. To be sure, the inconsistency with McNamee is
concerning. Do the motivations of the donor matter for gifts? If
they may be discounted against a larger factual background,
does this mean valuable gifts must be subject to legal formulae
in order to succeed? It is by no means clear that even
Declarations of Gift or passing about twigs or clumps of earth
would suffice if Buttar holds sway.55
The other problem with Buttar is that it may implicitly
support the undesirable elements of Townshend. That is, because
the court decided that the milk quota was not truly a gift, the
55

To be fair, a concern that legal formalities not be a sham is of ancient
vintage as well. See Frederick Pollock & Frederic William Maitland,
The History of the English Law before the Time of Edward I, 2nd ed
(Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 2010) vol 2 at 88.
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decision does not help answer whether the quota could also be
excluded in part like the $25,000 in Townshend. In other words,
it is unclear what it would take for a gift to lose its status as a
gift other than investing the value of the gift in the matrimonial
home or squandering it outside the family.56
§. 7. BROADER POLICY ISSUES
The problem gifts pose in the family law context strikes right at
the heart of what makes the dissolution of a family so tricky a
matter at law. What was once joined together has come asunder.
Yet, today we recognize for good reason that there are still two
individuals at the heart of the marriage. The rightless and
statusless feme-covert described by Blackstone thankfully no
longer exists.57 And if marriage consists of two legally
competent individuals, then there is reason to grant that
individuals may have things of their own. One can understand
why gifts should be excluded: they are not directly a contribution
y the donor to the “family”. o , to say that individuals
might have things individually does not mean everything should
be treated so. And thus the individually-held gift sits on the
nife’s edge that separates the autonomous individual from the
common “good” of the family. o ever, it is important to
remember that when two people marry, it is common to think
56

See e.g. FLA, supra note , s
“ he court may a ard a spouse an
amount that is more or less than half the difference between the net
family properties if the court is of the opinion that equalizing the net
family properties would be unconscionable, having regard to . . . (d) a
spouse’s intentional or rec less depletion of his or her net family
property”.

57

See Sir William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England in
Four Books, Notes selected from the editions of Archibold, Christian,
oleridge, hitty, te art, err, and Others, Barron ield’s nalysis,
and Additional Notes, and a Life of the Author by George Sharswood,
2 vols (Philadelphia: JB Lippincott Co, 1893), online:
<oll.libertyfund.org/titles/2140#Blackstone_1387-01_763>.
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that they intend to work together for this common purpose. If
anything, then, the default presumption should be that things
belong to the family in all but the clearest cases that the gift was
treated in an “exclusive” manner. n oth Townshend and Buttar,
the facts as described suggest that the gifts became family
possessions. Money invested in a joint investment account and
an income-generating milk quota both point squarely at the
family’s enefit.58
The analysis I have adopted here may seem to some to
fly in the face of the ct’s provision for “tracing”. Tracing
allows certain property, including gifts, to be found where it has
not been irrevocably comingled with other property or the donee
has not demonstrated an intention to share it with the other
spouse.59 In an insightful annotation to Berdette v. Berdette,
Professor McLeod suggested that a purpose of tracing should be
to encourage families to share their property.60 On this analysis,
spouses ould e discouraged from “sharing their gifted
property” if they risk losing the ability to trace the gift and seek
an exclusion if the marriage should end. I am not persuaded.
First, subsection 4(3) of the Act is clear that the person seeking

58

Tangible gifts, which hang on the wall or in the closet or sit in a
garage your Richard Prince Overseas Nurse, your mink coat, your
Maserati may deserve to be excluded if a gift. But cash and other
fungibles have less of a claim in that regard because it will often be
difficult to show that they were for private advantage.

59

FLA, supra note , s
“ he value of the follo ing property that a
spouse o ns on the valuation date does not form part of the spouse’s
net family property: . . . 5. Property, other than a matrimonial home,
into hich property referred to in paragraphs to can e traced.” ee
also the quotation from Cartier, supra note 45.

60

Berdette v Berdette (1991), 33 RFL (4th) 290, 1991 CarswellOnt 280
(WL Can) (Ont CA). The relevant portion of the annotation is
reproduced by Zylberman & Bruce, supra note 30 at 81 82.
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the exclusion is obliged to prove it.61 One might reasonably
expect that the donee ho “shares” a portion of the gift ill have
a harder time proving the exclusion than the spouse who
jealously or otherwise did not share a portion of the gift but
kept it fully separate.
Second, regarding the idea that liberal or lax tracing of
gifts will encourage sharing, the argument seems aimed at
family lawyers, academics, legal sophisticates, and, if indeed
they are a separate group, pessimists. To begin with the last
group, should we really imagine most people make decisions in
contemplation of the end of their marriage?62 Alternatively, it is
also hard to credit that most married people base their decisions
about how to treat gifts on consideration of the Act. What seems
more likely instead is that, upon sitting down with a family
lawyer because the marriage is at an end (or close to it) and
learning that things can e “traced” in complex ays, people ill
be inclined to decide that things they thought they had shared
were not, in the end, actually shared at all. Family money in joint
investment accounts, perhaps, becomes my money. This is
especially true if joint investment account monies can be
recovered at a rate of three quarters on the dollar.
Finally, from a more philosophical perspective, tracing
encourages people to privilege the time of the gift (when the
donor’s intentions matter and the date of separation hen there
is a tendency to revise or reinterpret past intentions and actions),
61

FLA, supra note 1, s 4(3).

62

Presumably, if tracing encourages anyone with respect to gifts, it might
be wealthy would-be donors who want assurance that their children
will be able to recover the (value of the) gift when they realize the error
of their ways and divorce their undeserving spouse. As I argue, these
concerns are contrary to the spirit of the Act and should be discounted.
or a radically different perspective, see usan
ea es, “ ifting eal
Property to Married Children: The Creation of Legal Fictions to Avoid
Section 4(2) of the Family Law Act”
an am
.
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and this emphasis comes at the cost of downplaying what
occurred during the marriage. What matters more than how
much of the gift is “left” is how it was treated when there was an
opportunity to use it for the common benefit of the family. The
doctrine of tracing does not encourage sharing in a family during
marriage because most people have not heard of it before
problems arise. What it encourages, in fact, is quite the opposite:
an increasingly unequal in literal and real world terms
“equalization” of the net family property. This point is
tautologically true for most people because tracing only comes
into play when spouses separate. I do not mean to suggest that
all tracing is wrong, for it serves a useful purpose in the right
circumstances. But the constraints on tracing I have in mind are
easily undermined when the starting point of a tracing exercise
egins ith a donor’s intentions. What happens then is that we
feel like we should trace the item because the donor wants or
would have liked us to do so. But as I have argued, what the
donor wishes at this point is irrelevant.63
What matters in both cases is how the (would-be) gift
was treated after being gifted. Both decisions, albeit in different
ways, evince far too great a concern with the intentions, goals,
and dreams of the donors. In Townshend there was no good
reason to do so beyond for determining that a gift had been
given. For the time after the date of the gift, the court should not
have let those intentions of the donor colour the interpretation of
the how the donee acted. In Buttar, the court arguably overvalued the wider intentions of the donor regarding the milk
quota if not outright confused motives with intentions. But it
is more disappointing that the court failed to address how the
milk quota was clearly used in a non-exclusive manner.
Regardless of whether a gift was given, it should be clear that it
lost its excludable “gift status” hen it as used to the general
63

Cf c eod’s annotation to Berdette, supra note
according to “strict
gift law . . . [a] gift is not unwound simply because the donor's
expectations did not materialize” .
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enefit of the family. he significance of a donor’s intentions
along with his or her actual control should not carry on beyond
the point at which control is surrendered.
Ultimately, we might question the wisdom of the
exclusion provisions in section 4 of the Act. It is somewhat
strange that the intentions of third parties carry so much weight
beyond the point of delivery of the gift. At best, it would make
sense to allow the intention of the donor to carry weight in the
evaluation of whether an excludable gift has been given, but not
carry any weight as to whether the gift should be excluded since
that intention normally ceases to carry any legal weight once
delivery is completed. And while it is certainly true that FLA,
subsection 4(2), paragraph , expressly permits a donor’s
“intention” to carry eight as to hether income derived from
the gift should also be excluded from the NFP calculation, it
does not mean that it is certainly right to do so. Even more
importantly, however, courts must be careful not to privilege the
intentions of donors, which can be murky enough to ascertain in
the first place, at the cost of dismissing the overt actions of the
donees. Otherwise, the courts risk undermining the very purpose
of the Act itself: to provide for the “equitable settlement of the
affairs of the spouses upon the rea do n of the partnership”.64

64

FLA, supra note 1, Preamble [emphasis added].

